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What can we expect from Europe’s Carbon Capture and Storage demonstrations? 
Vivian Scott, Scottish Carbon Capture and Storage, Edinburgh University, UK 
  
Abstract 
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) on electricity generation and energy intensive 
industry is expected to play a considerable role in achieving the European Union’s 
decarbonisation goals. EU CCS demonstration project funding has been created to 
encourage development and accelerate commercial CCS deployment by providing 
funds to bridge the capital gap for early commercial-scale CCS installation. Eleven 
CCS project proposals currently remain at least nominally active, but reduced 
funding and other constraints suggest delivery of at best around a third of these. To 
explore how these demonstrations impact on the scale of subsequent CCS 
deployment in the EU three simple scenarios for post-demonstration CCS activity 
and deployment (none, limited and considerable) are considered and examined in 
the context of key factors that have influenced the demonstration programme. 
Without strong political support for post-demonstration deployment including 
measures such as strategic storage validation and CO2 pipeline planning, and a clear 
process to make CCS commercially attractive to investors on a timeline consistent 
with climate ambitions, even a positive result from the demonstration programme is 
unlikely to enable CCS to deliver as expected.    
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Introduction 
The EU has considerable ambition for carbon capture and storage (CCS) to play a 
major role in decarbonisation efforts. The EU Commission’s Energy Roadmap 2050 
[1] – outlining EU energy policy options required to achieve the goal of 85-90% cut in 
CO2 emissions by 2050 envisages a 19 to 24% contribution to total reductions by CCS 
in all but the very high renewables scenario. To make such a contribution, CCS 
deployment is envisaged in the period 2020-2030, with CCS applied to all coal and 
gas power plant by 2030, and around half of the EU’s heavy industry by 2050.  
 
However, attempts to launch the technology at commercial scale in the EU through 
public co-funding of CCS demonstrations projects are struggling. At present, 
operating commercial-scale CCS is limited to a handful of facilities globally – mostly 
gas processing (e.g. Statoil’s Sleipner gas platform, Norway) in which the CO2 capture 
is a well-established and integrated process. None of these are located in the EU.  
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To try to launch CCS application to fossil power plant and energy intensive industries 
(e.g. steel and cement manufacture) publicly co-financed CCS demonstration project 
programmes are underway in much of the developed world including the European 
Union - “up to twelve”1, UK - “four projects”2, USA - “five to ten”, Canada - “up to 
six”, Australia - “three to five” and Norway - “one to two” [2]. To date, only four full-
chain commercial scale CCS demonstration projects (two in Canada two in the US) 
have so far taken positive final investment decision and commenced construction 
[3]. 
 
The EU CCS demonstration programme is designed principally to inform on two 
fundamental subjects: the technical possibility of CCS and the cost of the technology. 
It will also strongly indicate the stakeholder (government, business/industry and 
publics) acceptability of the application of CCS at scale [4]. Composed of two funds – 
the New Entrants Reserve 300 (NER300) of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS), and the European Economic Recovery Programme (EERP) – it aims to include 
the full range of currently available capture technologies (pre-, post-, oxy-
combustion for electricity generation and methods applicable to industrial capture) 
and storage solutions (on and offshore depleted hydrocarbon fields and saline 
aquifers) and be applied on both power and industrial plant. The results are intended 
to provide technical understanding and initial cost discovery for commercial scale 
CCS [5].  
 
Eleven EU CCS project proposals currently remain at least nominally active (Table 1), 
but reduced funding and other constraints suggest delivery of at very best around a 
third of these, and likely someway behind the originally envisaged timetable of 
operation by 2015.  
 
Table 1: Current EU CCS demonstration projects (2012). Abbreviations: Post – post combustion 
capture; oxy – oxyfired capture; pre- pre-combustion capture; EERP – European Economic Recovery 
Plan funding; NER1 – New Entrants Reserve 300 round 1 funding; UK – UK CCS commercialisation 
programme funding; FEED – Front End Engineering and Design. 
 
Country Project Capture Storage Funding Status comment 
UK Peterhead (gas) Post Offshore -
depleted gas 
NER1? UK? Storage site FEED completed 
Drax (coal)  Oxy Offshore – 
aquifer 
NER1? UK?  
Don Valley 
(coal)  
Pre Offshore – 
CO2-EOR  
EERP (€180mn)  Cancelled following withdrawal of UK 
Government support  (October 2012) 
[6] 
Teeside (coal)  Pre Offshore NER1? UK?  
Captain (coal) Pre Offshore UK? Not an applicant to NER round 1 
Netherlands ROAD (coal) Post Offshore -
depleted gas  
EERP (€180mn) 
+ NL (€150mn) 
All FEED completed and permitting 
near completion (2012) 
Green Hydrogen 
(hydrogen) 
Cryogenic Offshore -
depleted gas  
NER1?  
France Floranges (steel) Top gas Onshore – NER1?   Host facility facing uncertain future 
                                                        
1 The announced ambition of the European Council in 2007 – now expected to deliver at best around 
a third of this number of projects. 
2
 The UK Government competition is separately run to the EU funding mechanisms, but 
demonstration projects in the UK are at least partially expected to be included in the EU ambition 
through co-funding.  
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recycling aquifer following closure of blast furnace 
(Oct 2012) 
Italy Porto Tolle 
(coal)  
Post Offshore –
aquifer 
EERP (€100mn) 
+ NER1? 
Subject to permitting challenge 
(overruled 2011) 
Spain Compostilla 
(coal)  
Oxy Onshore –
aquifer 
EERP (€180mn) Not an applicant to NER round 1 
Poland Belchatow (coal) Post Onshore -
aquifer  
EERP (€180mn) 
+ NER1? 
 
Romania Getica (coal)  Post Onshore –
aquifer 
NER1?  
 
 
Now that this much reduced practical shape of the EU CCS demonstration 
programme is emerging, we can revisit and reflect on the outcomes that are looked 
for: what is realistically achievable from the CCS demonstrations as they stand 
today? What issues will remain to be explored? To explore this, three basic scenarios 
for post demonstration CCS deployment in the EU – none, very limited and 
considerable are presented. These are then considered in the context of major 
influencing factors raised by and/or facing CCS demonstration in the EU: public 
opinion, CO2 transport and storage infrastructure development, the carbon market 
and emissions reductions mandating, enhanced oil recovery, and gas power 
generation. What has the demonstration programme told us about these factors to 
date? How much will they impact upon deployment of CCS subsequent to the 
demonstration programme, and to what degree might a successful demonstration 
outcome (or otherwise) be able to influence these factors?    
 
Basic EU CCS deployment scenarios 
Broadly, there are three possible scenarios for commercial CCS (non-)deployment 
following different demonstration outcomes – none, limited, and considerable –
briefly outlined below.  
 
1. None   
Demonstrations show large-scale deployment of CCS to be too technically 
challenging. This scenario might arise because for instance capture processes prove 
unsatisfactory at commercial scale, because storage at the scale required is shown to 
be technologically unreliable, or because government, industry and other 
stakeholders fail to create a sufficiently encouraging environment for continued CCS 
activity [7]. Under this scenario, there is no CCS expansion beyond the first 
(essentially unsuccessful even if completed) demonstration projects, and the current 
considerable “wedge” [8] of CCS in EU CO2 emissions reduction scenarios will need 
to be reconsidered. Electricity generation has alternatives, though their deployment 
on the scale required to fully replace fossil fuel generation currently seems very 
challenging. Industrial emissions would (unless the facilities closed) remain an 
insoluble problem without unprecedented innovation.  
 
2. Limited  
Technical issues prove resolvable and storage is shown to be viable. However, the 
overall costs of CCS in especially power generation are in almost all cases 
commercially unattractive compared to alternative options. Prohibitive costs might 
arise from, for instance, additional as yet unforeseen technical costs, financial 
 4 
structure and liability problems and/or public and political rejection of preferential 
(cost-effective) plant, pipeline and storage sites [9].  
 
In this scenario, in the initial post-demonstration period CCS would at best be used 
very minimally in the power sector as a bridging technology [10]. This might take the 
form of retrofitting CCS on a very limited number of existing coal power plant where 
its installation is a sensible management of generation assets and/or fuel stock, but 
almost no new coal power with CCS would be built in the EU in the 2020s and 
beyond. However, where does this leave gas power and energy intensive industry? 
To achieve consistency with emissions reduction ambitions, both will either need to 
apply CCS from around the mid-2020s onwards, or be massively reduced in scale.  
With regard to gas, a broadly negative experience of CCS demonstration would likely 
dampen government and industry enthusiasm for a large scale deployment of CCS – 
but would sufficient alternatives be available? The issues around gas are examined in 
Section E below. For industrial sources, very limited existing CCS deployment – point 
capture to point storage, or small regional clusters in geographically convenient 
locations – would have little potential for easy connection or expansion to include 
large quantities of industrial sources. Unless industrial sources were able to fund (or 
be funded for) CCS expansion, closure seems the most likely alternative.  
 
3.  Considerable 
CCS proves both technically viable and economically credible under carbon pricing, 
emissions and low carbon generation subsidy policies, and for electricity generation 
cost competitive with renewables and nuclear. Under this scenario, power 
companies currently heavily invested in fossil fuel, especially those which own 
considerable coal assets, might retrofit existing and/or build new plant with CCS. This 
large scale of CCS operations would require long-distance (and trans-national) CO2 
pipeline networks that enable shared access to large storage resources, e.g. saline 
formations beneath the North Sea [11, 12]. The existence of such infrastructure 
would enable relatively straightforward and economical connection of additional 
sources (gas and industry) as required.  
 
Influencing factors 
The above are three very basic scenarios. To examine their likelihood, five 
interrelated factors that impact technical possibility, cost and stakeholder 
acceptability: public opinion, pipeline and infrastructure development policy, carbon 
markets and mandating of CCS, enhanced oil recovery potential and most 
importantly the role of gas, are now examined. These have already had considerable 
impact on EU CCS demonstration efforts, and how they are addressed will have a 
huge influence both on the outcomes of demonstration, and on the scale and shape 
of any post demonstration CCS deployment.  
 
A. Public opinion. There is considerable trepidation in both industry and government 
regarding social acceptance of the demonstration projects and subsequent CCS 
deployment. To date, experience with public opinion regarding CCS development has 
been mixed and the underlying reasons multifaceted and to a degree project specific 
[13]. Onshore CO2 storage has perhaps caused the greatest concern, both with 
regards to its safety, and – especially when located remote from the economic 
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benefit (jobs) of the CO2 source – the question of “why here – what’s in it for us?” 
Different projects have experienced different levels of opposition. Where a localised 
benefit (job preservation and creation) is perceived by communities a less negative 
reaction has generally resulted. However, where a project is planned in an area of 
vibrant economic activity, the apparent benefits for employment may not be so 
attractive, and building new infrastructure in a crowded or picturesque area may 
also not be an attractive option for local residents.  
 
Research also shows that local public's concerns often additionally relate to the 
broader direction of national energy policies and to the role of technologies and 
options including CCS, nuclear, renewables, demand reduction and so forth. When 
faced with the option of CCS, local publics frequently begin to question how low-
carbon energy development is being thought about and planned, stimulating 
questions that are not easily answered by CCS developers (who, by definition, are 
focused only on CCS).  
 
The candidate CCS demonstration and pilot CO2 injection projects at Compostilla and 
Hontomin (Spain), and the full chain CCS pilot at Lacq (France), have had relatively 
positive experience with local governments and communities. These projects have it 
appears gained better support both through a degree of existing local experience of 
subsurface industry, and the fostering of good local connections between the project 
developers (including research institutes in several cases) and the community by 
efforts to consult and involve local stakeholders from the early stages of project 
planning.  
 
To date, CCS demonstration projects cancellations resulting in the large part from 
public opposition to onshore storage have occurred in Germany and the 
Netherlands, while projects featuring incomplete CCS on new coal have been 
abandoned in the UK due to strong opposition to further unabated coal power. With 
respect to storage, successful less controversial (offshore storage) demonstration 
projects may gradually help to allay fears, but could equally result in the position 
that if CO2 storage works offshore – why bring it onshore? With no demonstrations 
yet being built let alone operating this is too early to tell, but widespread rejection of 
onshore storage would certainly increase the costs and complexity, and thereby both 
slow and limit the potential for EU-wide CCS deployment [11]. Additionally, while the 
current focus of public concern has been on storage, actual projects, involving for 
instance the construction of visually large chemical capture facilities might well 
result in new concerns. 
 
B. CO2 pipeline infrastructure. CCS deployment scenarios 2 and 3 both require CO2 
pipeline beyond that built for demonstration projects. In the case of the UK and the 
Netherlands, both of which have regions containing multiple demonstration project 
proposals, it is inefficient to build single point to point transport pipelines for each 
project [14-16]. NER300 funding allows project proposals to apportion some of their 
expected infrastructure costs to ‘partner’ projects with the caveat that the project 
has access to sufficient funds to go it alone if necessary. Demonstration-phase 
clusters would also enable practical experience of the regulatory, commercial and 
contractual formulations required for sharing pipeline and/or storage facilities – 
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important to enabling larger-scale network development as part of commercial 
deployment – though at the risk of this greater complexity slowing demonstration 
project delivery.   
 
The general location of the major potential storage sites that would be required in 
the case of scenario 3 are known, as (although these could change) are the expected 
locations of major concentrations of source facilities (both power plant and industry) 
[17]. The major unknown element of the equation is the volume of CO2 that will 
require transportation. This is why the European Commission, discussing CO2 
infrastructure in its proposed EU Energy Infrastructure Package [18], has difficulty 
defining “known needs” and “unknown needs”. CO2 volume remains for the present 
an “unknown”. There is certainly potential for a degree of over-sizing of initial CCS 
pipeline infrastructure on a reasonable “no-regrets” basis as has been shown by 
studies in both the Netherlands [19], and the UK [14] to enable local clusters to 
develop quickly. However, the large-scale deployment described in scenario 3, 
especially if onshore storage remains politically difficult, will require a much larger 
trans-European pipeline network (comparable in scale to present natural gas 
transmission networks) connecting source regions to major storage locations [11].  
 
The eventual CO2 pipeline and storage infrastructure demand presently remains an 
unknown. However, major trans-European pipeline developments, and storage site 
appraisals (especially in the case of relatively under-researched to date saline 
aquifers) have long lead times often of around ten or more years. Given this, early 
strategic planning of priority corridors, hub locations, and evaluation and initial 
exploration of large capacity storage options is essential to enable the large scale 
deployment of CCS on the timescale consistent with achieving its desired role. 
Without this preparation, large-scale CCS deployment will be at best significantly 
delayed, and might even prove unattainable, even if CCS demonstration projects 
themselves prove successful. Such preparation, while inexpensive compared to the 
actual costs of the infrastructure itself, is probably too speculative to be undertaken 
solely by industry and requires strategic activity by government. Leveraging 
demonstration projects to assist in this process, by acting as seeds to future CO2 
transport and storage networks should be strongly encouraged [20]. Relevant 
actions would include widening key pipeline wayleaves such as those on foreshores 
to allow for efficient parallel expansion, and using small amounts of the captured 
CO2 for test injections into potential future stores in the vicinity of the primary store 
– e.g. saline aquifers nearby a depleted gas-field storage site.        
 
C. Carbon markets and mandating. The EU ETS, the centrepiece of EU climate policy, 
is now entering its third phase. Thus far, due to a structural oversupply of EU 
Emissions Allowances (EUAs) resulting from a series of demand (the 2008 financial 
crash and subsequent recession), and supply (overlap with other decarbonisation 
policies) shocks, the EUA price (< € 8/tCO2 – 2012) has fallen well below that 
envisaged to encourage decarbonisation activity including the adoption of CCS [21]. 
Its reform – e.g. through the set-aside of EUAs is an area of active discussion [22].  
 
Alternative measures to prevent new unabated coal power construction, and 
possibly encourage CCS adoption beyond the existing capital funding (EERP and 
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NER300) for demonstrations are an active area of policy debate at both regional, 
national and EU scale [23]. In terms of preventing new unabated coal, of the six CCS 
demonstration projects awarded support under the EERP, fully three are in de facto 
‘any new coal must have CCS’ mandating regimes, due to national or local 
government policy to not permit new coal power plant unless CCS is used. These 
projects are: Don Valley (UK) – cancelled in October 2012, subject to the UK 
government’s policy commitments in the Electricity Market Reform package for “no 
new coal without CCS and an emissions performance standard (EPS)” [24]; 
Jänschwalde (Brandenburg, Germany) – cancelled in December 2011, subject to the 
regional government’s policy of “no new coal without CCS”; and ROAD (Rotterdam, 
Netherlands) where the Rotterdam Climate Initiative has a commitment to a “50% 
reduction in CO2 by 2025, relative to 1990” [25] – by implication no new coal without 
CCS.  
 
As the struggles of the demonstration programme to date have seemingly 
demonstrated, even with large capital grants, the expense and risk of CCS is 
commercially unattractive. Encouraging CCS adoption in the power sector requires 
market incentive that makes it at least (if not more given the technology risk) 
attractive as the alternatives – either in the form of a sufficiently high EUA price 
and/or preferential electricity pricing and grid access. A modified EUA price would 
have to be high enough to make in the first instance CCS on coal power (subject to 
fuel costs), competitive with unabated gas power and the same applies for 
preferential electricity pricing. The UK government is (on paper at least) leading on 
this, with proposals in the Electricity Market Reform package to introduce a fixed 
price for CCS power generation at a level competitive with renewable or nuclear 
subsidy [24].   
 
Demonstration projects have a critical role to play in establishing both the capital 
and operating costs of CCS in the power sector. However, to ensure they can fulfil 
this role, they need to happen. It is perhaps unlikely that any EU ETS reform will have 
taken sufficient effect on the price of EUAs to adequately incentivise the imminently 
needed demonstration project investment from industry, so a generous preferential 
pricing regime (and/or priority grid access) targeted specifically at demonstration 
projects should be strongly considered to help secure this crucial investment. 
Government has a stark choice – keep to the current arrangement and risk CCS 
demonstration programme failure, making deployment scenario 1 (no deployment) 
very likely, or recognise that the current support is insufficient and apply corrective 
measures that ensure demonstration project delivery.      
 
D. Enhanced oil recovery (EOR). Since first undertaken in the Sacroc field (Texas) in 
1972, CO2-EOR activity has continually expanded across the oil producing region of 
the southern US. While the original Sacroc field injection used CO2 from a nearby gas 
processing facility, the expansion of CO2-EOR was largely enabled by the plentiful 
supplies of CO2 found in natural CO2 reservoirs such as the McElmo Dome 
(Colorado). As these natural sources have depleted, interest in sourcing man-made 
CO2 has increased, with many gas processing facilities in the region now selling CO2, 
which requires scrubbing in any case from the gas, for use in CO2-EOR operations 
instead of venting it. This value for CO2 (currently around $20-30/tCO2) provides 
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potential revenue for CCS power and industry projects. The two power plant CCS 
demonstrations that have taken final investment decision and commenced 
construction – Kemper County IGCC (Mississippi, US)3, and Boundary Dam 
(Saskatchewan, Canada) both have contracts in place for sale of captured CO2 for 
CO2-EOR. 
 
What possibility is there for CO2-EOR in and around the EU – primarily in the North 
Sea? The situation is markedly different to that in North America in a number of 
aspects. Europe’s oilfields are located offshore which not only adds to the overall 
complexity of any CO2 injection operations, but also means that depleting oilfields 
have generally already undergone additional recovery by injection of (plentiful) 
seawater. The geology of North Sea oilfields is also different to that found in the 
primary CO2-EOR region - the Permian Basin in the southern US. The thicker and 
more compartmentalised reservoirs of the North Sea are thought to make sweeping 
the reservoir with CO2 less effective than in the thinner layered reservoirs found in 
the Permian Basin. However, initial studies indicate that CO2-EOR in the North Sea 
might still prove commercially viable (Scottish Carbon Capture and Storage, 2009). 
The biggest issue for North Sea CO2-EOR is arguably the lack of sufficient quantities 
of easily available CO2 [26].  
 
CCS demonstration projects have the potential to change this4. The 2CO Don Valley 
(UK) demonstration proposal envisaged storage (and additional revenue) from CO2-
EOR in the North Sea [27], and CO2-EOR was also strongly considered for the Green 
Hydrogen project (Netherlands) [16]. However, in October 2012 the Don Valley 
project failed to secure UK Government funding [6] leaving North Sea CO2-EOR 
potential an open question that none of the remaining demonstration proposals 
seek to address. While reliance on revenues from CO2-EOR has been viewed as 
increasing the project risk, should it have proven technologically and economically 
successful, it had the potential to play a significant role in stimulating subsequent 
CCS deployment in NW Europe. It remains to see if new CO2-EOR proposals are made 
(e.g. for NER round 2), or perhaps as additional operations subsequently connected 
onto demonstration projects. 
 
E. Gas.  
Natural gas is expected to play a growing role in the EU’s energy mix [1], both from 
domestic sources (with shale gas development possibly replacing depleting 
production from conventional fields), and from outside the EU via pipeline or LNG 
shipping. In the short term, replacing unabated coal capacity with gas does offer 
significant advantages – halving CO2 emissions per unit electricity, reducing air 
pollution, and, depending on the specifics of the gas plant built potentially enabling 
better balancing of intermittent renewables. However, caution must be exercised 
that this does not ‘lock-in’ large amounts of unabated fossil capacity. Theoretically, 
the EUs ‘capture-ready’ feasibility assessment requirements for new gas power plant 
                                                        
3
 Construction of Kemper County IGCC is presently (2012) on hold following legal challenge of rate 
recovery arrangements following increase in the project’s capital cost. 
4
 While use of CO2 for EOR does not necessarily involve monitored and verified storage, EU funded 
CCS with EOR projects will be subject to the monitoring and verification requirements of the EU CO2 
storage directive.    
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should encourage thinking around enabling for retrofitting, but to date capture-
readiness is having limited effect (e.g. in encouraging appropriate siting of new gas 
plant for easy connection to storage – [28]). 
 
Longer term (2030-2050) emissions targets are only consistent with either CCS on 
gas, or very limited gas generation, but the gas industry is as yet not receiving a clear 
message on the determination of policy ambition. As an example, while the UK 
Government in 2010 followed the recommendation of the UK Committee on Climate 
Change (UKCCC) to formally open its CCS demonstration programme to gas power 
projects [29], it subsequently announced policy intention to enable ‘grandfathering’ 
of gas power plant consented under a soon to be introduced Emissions Performance 
Standard of 450g/kWh (consistent with modern unabated CCGT plant) until 2045 
[30] and ‘gas continuing to play an important role in the energy mix… beyond 
2030..[not] restricted to providing back up to renewables’. The UKCCC has declared 
this position to be ‘incompatible with meeting legislated carbon budgets’ [31].  
 
This situation is also impacting on CCS demonstration in the power sector more 
broadly. Persuading investors to favour expensive (and untried) coal with CCS, over 
unabated (though possibly) ‘capture-ready’ gas requires either a very high carbon 
price and/or very high gas price [32] – neither of which seem likely at present. 
 
The first set of publicly funded CCS demonstrations in Europe are unlikely to include 
a gas power plant project. The EU 2050 Energy Roadmap [1] envisages CCS on gas 
‘from around 2030 onwards’, but only one gas power project has been submitted for 
EU funding (Peterhead, Scotland) and the assessment of the round 1 NER300 
projects by the European Investment Bank on a cost per unit CO2 emission 
abatement achieved gives strong preference to funding CCS on coal [33]. The 
Peterhead proposal ranked lowest on the European Investment Bank’s NER round 1 
assessment of project proposals [34].  
 
However, gas generation with CCS may offer overall advantage over coal generation 
with CCS. CO2 separation from gas fired power is more challenging due to the lower 
concentration of CO2 in the flue gas, but the overall penalty of CCS on plant 
efficiency can be lower than for coal, and per unit electricity produced, the volumes 
of captured CO2 requiring transport and storage are significantly reduced (around 
50% lower) [4]. The selection and assessment criteria for the second phase of the 
NER300 (funds from the auction of the remaining 100 million EUAs) remains to be 
defined. There is a strong case to either specify gas power generation as a category, 
or to assess the power projects proposals on the cost per unit of low carbon 
electricity, a metric under which CCS gas is expected to be competitive with CCS coal. 
This represents a crucial opportunity to establish utility confidence in the technology 
in a timeframe allowing for CCS on gas deployment consistent with the proposals of 
the EU Energy 2050 roadmap. To encourage such deployment, exploration of how 
gas with CCS can be appropriately incentivised to make it commercially attractive 
also needs detailed policy discussion. For instance, early gas plant with CCS (and 
therefore higher levilised opex), would have to co-exist with unabated gas plants 
(lower levilised opex). What level of carbon price would be needed to make 
operation of the gas plant with CCS favourable? Would other measures – e.g. 
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enabling some flexibility of the CO2 capture allow for better overall (from both a cost 
and emissions perspective) operation of the electricity system?  Further, while the 
EU is currently falling behind competitor markets in CCS on coal [35], CCS on gas 
offers an opportunity for European industry to take a leading role in the technology, 
building on work undertaken at the pilot facilities at Lacq, France [36], and 
Mongstad, Norway [37]. 
 
The degree to which gas explicitly features in the EU’s CCS demonstration 
programme and the debates around commercial incentives/mandating of CCS may, 
indeed, prove the single most important factor affecting the chance to grow a major 
European CCS sector: if the sector includes gas, it will achieve commercial scale; if it 
excludes gas, it will start small and likely remain small. Unless sufficient alternatives 
emerge, such an outcome could represent a major barrier to achieving overall 
energy decarbonisation. Gas, initially unabated, but subsequently with CCS has the 
potential to play a huge role in decarbonising the EU’s energy sector [38]. However, 
proactive policy, learning from the lessons of coal CCS demonstration, and 
addressing gas-specific requirements is critical to enabling its delivery.      
 
Outcomes of CCS demonstration 
What, therefore, can we look for from the demonstration programme? Eleven EU 
CCS project proposals currently remain at least nominally active, but reduced 
funding (resulting from the low EUA price and constrained national budgets) and the 
other constraints outlined above suggest delivery of at best around a third of these. 
The first hurdle is the confirmation of sufficient co-funding from EU Member States 
for the first round of the NER300 to be awarded, and for the selected projects to be 
in a position to take a positive final investment decision. Should this not happen, the 
future role of CCS in the EU would be in very serious doubt – it is highly unlikely that 
sufficiently serious and coordinated political will to undertake and fund a fresh 
demonstration programme would be forthcoming. Even if commercially proven CCS 
technology were imported from elsewhere at a later date, its overall contribution to 
emissions mitigation would likely be much smaller than currently envisaged. As a 
result EU emissions mitigation strategy would have to be rapidly re-thought, without 
reliance on any sizeable amount of CCS. This outcome maps to deployment scenario 
1 (none), or at best scenario 2 (limited).   
 
Should a small number of demonstration projects proceed, then, approaching 2020, 
the EU CCS demonstration programme will be in a position to be able to answer the 
fundamental question of technical possibility of CCS for (at least) coal power 
generation. It should also deliver some degree of cost discovery and experience of 
how CCS operates in the carbon market, and provide some limited information on 
public opinion regarding active CCS operation. Depending on the specific projects 
chosen, they could establish some early pipeline infrastructure of likely use to future 
networks, and (should new proposals emerge) undertake initial exploration of CO2-
EOR possibility. This experience of CCS demonstrations will probably determine 
whether or not CCS deployment will occur (scenarios 2 – limited, and 3 – 
considerable), or be found to be too challenging to pursue further (scenario 1 – 
none).   
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Nonetheless, the first generation of CCS plant will certainly be unable to accurately 
predict which of the deployment scenarios 2 or 3 is most plausible. While 
demonstrations will provide considerable education on the cost of CCS technology, 
as experimental first-of-a-kind facilities they are unlikely to become reference plant 
that set industry standards. Regarding storage and infrastructure, demonstrations 
will again test feasibility in individual cases, but won’t be able to conclusively prove 
whether or not there is sufficient politically and commercially acceptable storage 
and pipeline for large scale deployment [39]. Most critically, while successfully 
demonstrating CCS on coal will help to build a case for further deployment, it must 
also be demonstrated on gas. Here, the second phase of the NER300 has a critical 
role to play in filling gaps in both the geographical spread of projects, and their fuel-
type and CO2 capture technology. 
 
Assuming that CCS demonstrations prove CCS viable, we must recognise that the 
road to aspired levels of deployment will remain long and steep. Continued political 
will translated into active, consistent and coherent policy remains the essential 
ingredient to determine the overall success and scale of CCS as a mitigation method 
both in Europe and indeed worldwide. Without this action, CCS in the EU is at best 
likely to be deployed slowly and with little overall reach [40] – perhaps restricted to 
a few advantageous niches. To enable significant deployment, Government must 
commit to actively supporting CCS beyond demonstrations – addressing public 
concerns, enacting supportive market measures, and in critical areas through direct 
funding contributions towards the capital expenditure of planning and developing 
CCS pipeline and storage infrastructures beyond, and building on those associated 
specifically with demonstration projects. 
 
Following successful demonstration, in return for continuing political (and financial) 
support, industry should accept regulation (through reform of the EU ETS, and 
additional measures such as emissions performance standards) that ensures the 
application of CCS on a timetable consistent with delivering the EU’s emissions 
reduction objectives. 
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